In this paper we try to show that a salary cap, as it is proposed by the G- 
Introduction

It is well known that many professional football clubs in
.
In the free-agency player market that emerged after the abolition of the Reserve
Clause in the mid seventies, the North American major leagues have experienced an explosion in player salaries (see Quirk and Fort, 1992 Deloitte and Touche, 2002 
The total cost C i is the sum of the player cost and the capital cost, i.e.: Quirk and Fort, 1992) . Kesenne (2000) . Kesenne, 2000) . This can be illustrated in Figure 1 
It follows that a comparison between the impact of a US cap and a G-14 cap is more relevant if the US cap is considered as a pure payroll cap, without any revenue sharing between richer and poorer clubs, as in
0 0 ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i i i c x c R c R MC M x d x x α α α ∂ + ∂ + ∂ = = = = ∂ ∂ R(5)i i i R c x i A R α α = =(6)
If the salary cap is binding for all clubs, large and small, the market equilibrium is
found where:
where Kesenne, 1996) . 
c is the equilibrium marginal cost of talent. The market equilibrium is now found at the point of intersection of the AR-curves. It follows that imposing the G-14 cap results in the same market equilibrium as in a winning maximizing league, at least in the absence of any capital cost (see
Compared with the unrestricted market equilibrium in a profit maximizing league, the
This can also be illustrated in figure 2 , where both the marginal and the average revenue curves are drawn for quadratic revenue functions.
Figure 2. G-14 salary cap in a profit maximizing league
The point of intersection (D) of the AR-curves shows a more unequal distribution of playing talent than the point of intersection (A) of the MR-curves. However, the salary level that emerges after the introduction of the salary cap, is not fixed at the point of intersection of the AR-curves, because it depends on the share parameter. If the main objective of the G-14 type of salary cap is to lower the player salaries, the share parameter will be chosen low enough in order to lower the player compensation (the G-14 is considering 60 %). The player salary can then simply be calculated as:
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However, a few remarks are in place at this point.
Firstly, the above result is derived for a simple quadratic revenue function. Fort and
Quirk (2000) Dobson and Goddard, 2001 
The G-14 salary cap in a win maximizing league
Many economists have serious doubts that European football clubs are profit
maximizers (see Sloane, 1971 
where can also include a certain profit level, it can be derived that the clubs' demand for talent is given by the net average revenue curve:
The market equilibrium is then found where:
If the G-14 salary cap (4) 
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